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BOOK REVIEW
A Review of David E. Johnson’s Kant’s Dog: On Borges, Philosophy,
and the Time of Translation (SUNY University Press, 2012, 274pp.)
STEPHEN D. GINGERICH

“EL PERRO DE KANT”: TIME, BORGES, KANT’S DOG

Humor is not usually counted among the traits of good literary criticism.
Kant’s Dog announces itself with an apparent joke, and in the third chapter, which shares the book’s name minus the subtitle, we are told that
Borges takes Kant’s dog out for a walk in the park. Johnson explains that,
by way of this canine constitutional, Borges offers a critique of transcendental philosophy’s grounding of concepts of knowledge. Though the level
of wit is never as high as in “Kant’s Dog,” Johnson carries out a similar
critical operation in each chapter of his book. He confronts Borges’s texts
with philosophical figures and texts to which Borges alludes in Ficciones
and elsewhere, and sometimes with things to which Borges does not, in
fact, allude. Indeed, some of Johnson’s points of reference would have to
be avant la lettre; discussions of Derrida and Derrida scholars Rodolphe
Gasche and Martin Hagglund set the philosophical bar high. Other references—to Kant’s dog, Schopenhauer’s cat, the idiot god, and an in-born,
mechanical human heart—clearly exist neither in reality nor in Borges’s
texts. Not only does Borges walk Kant’s dog. He also refutes, time and again,
Aristotle’s, then Augustine’s, then Heidegger’s understanding of time. He
tries Hume’s faith in the external world. He shakes Aristotle’s confidence in
the possibility of a stable, unequivocal basis for ethical decision. Invoking
the texts of all three major Abrahamic religions, he calls God to the stand
in order to spell out an ethics of immortality. On the one hand, Johnson is
one kind of reader that Borges engenders: a scholar willing to chase down
allusions and work out intricate interplay of text and intertext. But also,

as we shall see, his dazzling display of expertise gives priority to thinking
through, again, and beyond (if thinking through is not always also beyond)
the problems that occupied Borges.
Chapter 3, “Kant’s Dog,” can give us a good sense of the book as a whole.
Those who know anything about Kant the man probably know of his daily
walks. What we didn’t picture was the dog that accompanied him, restrained
in accordance with a “philosophical leash law” meant to keep him from running amok and causing his owner unexpected trouble. Johnson frames his
third chapter with this story, suggested by a “key moment” in “Funes the
Memorious” (91). We are reminded that in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
“trots out” a dog at the precise point at which he sets out to establish the
objective validity of concepts drawn from sense experience. In other words,
when Kant wants to explain how the understanding manages to turn the
manifold of sensation into comprehensible units, he chooses as an example
our recognition of a dog as a dog. How can we say that what we see is a
dog? This is the work of imagination, which often appears to be Johnson’s
main concern. Neither passive nor active, neither sense nor understanding,
interior nor exterior, it “inscribes the transcendental” (93). That is to say, it
makes the universality of knowledge possible. But its inscription also “singularizes the universal,” ruining the purity of traditional categories of reality or
materiality and of subjectivity or conceptuality. The imagination “makes it
possible to see and name, to know or to recognize, a dog as a dog,” yet it does
so at the price of “(making) it impossible that the dog will ever be one” (93).
Johnson notes that Borges’s narrator in “Funes” also evokes a dog as an
illustration of Funes’s discomfort that what is called a dog one minute should
retain the same name the next minute. This is Kant’s dog, says Johnson,
and this chapter shows how Borges’s text, by virtue of Funes’s rejection of
Kant’s dog, poses an “implicit challenge to Kant” (92). Kant’s analysis of
imagination acknowledges the temporal character of thought, but when
Borges takes the dog out, testing the temporal synthesis of the imagination,
he finds that it puts Funes in the position of being so absolutely present as
to be dead, so alive as to be deceased (118-19). Borges does not improve on
Kant but, rather, follows up on Kantian imagination by inscribing again the
aporetic nature of the universal, of objective knowledge: we can see and
know and name the dog only at the price of killing it.
But Johnson’s intention is not to identify a philosophical position
belonging to Borges, Kant, or even Funes. We ought to be careful not
to translate “Kant’s dog” into a simple dismissal of a philosopher or of
philosophy, in general. Though the challenge to Kant consists in discerning

“the necessary inscription of the empirical as the impossible condition of
possibility for the transcendental determination of thought and experience”
(92), such an insight can hardly be ascribed to Borges, at least not rigorously,
for the “condition of possibility of thought” is, in Johnson’s telling, an impossible one. Indeed, both Kant and Borges offer an approach to this aporia,
while both, at the same time, demonstrate a failure to appreciate the radicality and the necessity of the aporia. In his first chapter, Johnson concludes
that Borges “retreats” from the implications of his own utterances about the
indeterminacy of the future by claiming a liberating effect for the concept
of eternity (39) rather than a “logic of survival” whereby we live on (42). In
spite of himself, Borges’s effort to save us from time estranges us from life.
Johnson returns time and again to the problem of inscription, the
necessity of an empirical marker that would at once ground and undermine,
affirm and negate the transcendental operations that philosophy traditionally
looks to as the foundation for truth, certainty, and objectivity. Inscription,
Johnson argues in his introduction, is another name for imagination, and it
is perhaps as a meditation on imagination that we can most easily grasp the
discussions that make up the other four chapters and the Afterword of Kant’s
Dog, all of which weave readings of Borges with interpretations of texts that
Borges evokes. Chapter 1, “Time: For Borges,” examines Borges’s essays
on time, along with canonical texts by Aristotle, Augustine, Heidegger,
and Derrida, concluding that the author of “A New Refutation of Time”
“retreats” from the implications of his own utterances about the indetermi
nacy of the future, and hence about time. Chapter 2, “Belief, in Translation,”
combines exegeses of “Pierre Menard” and essays on translation of classics
and film with a reflection on the theme of the “secret operation” of belief in
Hume. For Johnson, following Borges, translation must be seen as a kind
of repetition of an original that is always already a translation. In spite of a
kind of structural belief to the contrary, the condition of possibility of being
repeatable, and hence of being legible or comprehensible at all, is being
repetitive (repeating a perfectly good original). Chapter 4, “Decisions of
Hospitality,” takes up Borges’s essays on metaphor to explore the possibility
of an unequivocal meaning that could ground decision-making. Reading
Borges’s “Garden of Forking Paths” and other fictions, the decision becomes
the site of ethical thinking. Echoing Derrida’s work on hospitality, which
Johnson reads alongside Aristotle, Heidegger, and Augustine, he concludes
that ethical decisions are always made in the face of the uncertainty that
results from “irreducible metaphoricity” (146). In chapter 5, “Idiocy, the
Name of God,” Johnson elaborates the interplay in “The Aleph” between

pantheism and a number of source texts: the Bible, the Koran, Kabbala, and
other theological commentaries. The ethics of immortality is no ethics at
all; to be ethical, God must be mortal and if immortal, he is not only not an
ethical being but impossible.
Borges scholars will be interested in Johnsons book for his contributions
to ongoing scholarly debates about the interpretation of specific texts and his
perceptive analyses of what he refers to in the introduction as “accidental”
details (9). However, any reader is bound to learn as much about Kant,
Heidegger, Derrida, Maimonides, Locke, and so forth as about Borges, per
se. Kant’s Dog is thus also for the non-Borges specialist, a reader who is
interested in what interested Borges, but not only or necessarily because it
interested Borges. That a fantastical tale or a detective story can be inter
preted as an intervention in philosophical discussions of life and death, the
concept and the example, time and causation, freedom and choice, and so
on, the awareness of this we owe more to Borges than to any other writer
in the Western canon. Recalling Borges’s equation of the imagination with
Greek phantasia, Johnson asserts that “the fantastic ... is the only possible
genre, not only of literature, but also of thought and life” (17). Kant’s Dog
contributes to an appreciation of how seriously we should take Borges as a
creative writer and thinker (Dichter und Denker, in the inimitable German
idiom), but also, if I may put it this way, as a liver.
As enigmatic as the title’s evocation of Kant’s dog is the designation in
the subtitle of “the time of translation” as one of the book’s primary themes.
It would be tempting to correct this, in fact, and insist that the concept that
most orients Johnson’s readings of Borges and the myriad philosophers and
literary thinkers is the imagination. Imagination temporalizes the universal, inserts it into history and into mortal life. Without the imagination,
the universal (and hence conceptuality and all projects of knowing) cannot
be, but imagination also links the universal irrevocably and irreparably to
the singular. Translation’s time is another way of talking about imagination’s temporalizing function. This substitution maybe advisable because of
Borges’s investment in translation over imagination, which he seems to have
viewed, rather than as the faculty that synthesizes universal and particular
(Kant’s Einbildungskraft), in more conventional terms as the ability to produce fictions. It might be news to practicing translators that translation has
a time. Certainly, the act of translation—embodied, archived in any particular translation—manifests a temporal relation, the past text, rendered
contemporary and made available for a certain posterity. But we should
not mistake this reflection on translation for the reflections of a translator

in a conventional sense, meant, as it were, for other practicing translators.
Indeed, it should not surprise us that the time of translation is the time of
time, translation serving as one of several means of articulating the nature
of temporality.
For Johnson, as he says in the introductory chapter, "Philosophy,
Literature and the Accidents of Translation;' the effort to think time
requires engaging the relationship between literature and philosophy,
which itself requires not only speaking of that relation but entering into it
as he reads literary and philosophical texts together, where both encounter
each other and themselves as/at the limits of sense and understanding. For
some, philosophy is born with the effort to deny poetry its transcendental
significance, but it is undeniable that in this day and age philosophy
and literature both enjoy a privileged discursive status in the project of
plumbing the depths of human experience. The same could not be said for
translation. It is often assumed to be a technical exercise of transference of
meaning, celebrated for allowing wider access to thought, poetic sensibility
and reflection, knowledge, and cultural manifestations. Rarely are we
reminded that it, too, touches on the very emergence of sense, conscious
ness, and inventions. Kant's Dog lends translation a prestige reserved for
other humanistic discourses. This task appears to coincide with Borges,
whose statement about translation bears repeating: "No problem (is) as
consubstantial to literature and its modest mystery as the one posed by
translation'' (cited 48). When this statement was published (in two separate
essays) in 1932, it may have been a mere joke on the part of a young writer
who had devoted himself to poems and essays. Humor aside, Kant's Dog
demonstrates, with imagination, how Borges's life and work bear it out.
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